Εµπιστευτικό τηλεγράφηµα της υπουργού Εξωτερικών των ΗΠΑ Κοντολίζας Ράις, το οποίο διέρρευσε από το Wikileaks, δείχνει ότι οι Αµερικανοί είχαν οδηγίες να προσεγγίσουν τον «ήρεµο Φινλανδό», ο οποίος στήριζε την άνευ όρων ένταξη της Τουρκίας στην Ε.Ε. Επίµονο «κορτάρισµα» στον Ολι Ρεν – επίτροπο για τη.... ∆ιεύρυνση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης από το 2004 έως το 2009 – έκαναν οι Αµερικανοί το 2007, χρονιά κατά την οποία διαφαινόταν το ναυάγιο της ευρωπαϊκής πορείας της Τουρκίας.
Λίγο νωρίτερα, ήταν η φινλανδική προεδρία της Ε.Ε.που είχε διασώσει την Τουρκία από την επιβολή κυρώσεων. Οπωςπροκύπτει από εµπιστευτικό τηλεγράφηµα της τότε υπουργού Εξωτερικών των ΗΠΑ Κοντολίζας Ράις που διέρρευσε από το Wikileaks, οι Αµερικανοί είχαν οδηγίες να προσεγγίσουν τον «ήρεµο Φινλανδό», ο οποίος ποτέ δεν (Δείτε στο τέλος το τηλεγράφημα)...
έκρυψε ότι στήριζε την άνευ όρων ένταξη της Τουρκίας στην Ε.Ε.
Ο φινλανδός επίτροπος που σήµερα ζητά συναίνεση στην Ελλάδα, υποσχέθηκε στον αµερικανό πρεσβευτή στην Αθήνα το 2006 πως θα φρόντιζε να θυµηθούν όλοι ότι το σχέδιο Ανάν ήταν σύµφωνο µε τοκοινοτικό κεκτηµένο... Στις 20 Μαρτίου 2007 σε εµπιστευτικό τηλεγράφηµα της Κοντολίζας Ράις µε προορισµό το Ελσίνκι,την Αγκυρα, το Βελιγράδι, τις Βρυξέλλες και τα Σκόπια, προκύπτει η πρόθεση των Αµερικανών να προσεγγίσουν τον επίτροπο για ναπροωθήσουν τη δική τους ατζέντα.
Ο αµερικανός αναπληρωτής ΥΠΕΞ Ντάνιελ Φριντ, ο οποίος έχει συντάξει το τηλεγράφηµα, ενθαρρύνει µελλοντικές συναντήσεις µε τον Ρεν και δίνει οδηγίες για τα θέµατα που η αµερικανική πλευρά οφείλει να του θέσει, µε κυρίαρχο την προώθηση της ευρωπαϊκής πορείας της Τουρκίας. Μάλιστα, γράφει ότι η επόµενη συνάντηση µε τον Φινλανδόπρέπει να γίνει άµεσα, στην επόµενη επίσκεψή του στο Ελσίνκι.
«Η φινλανδική προεδρία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης πέτυχε έναν συµβιβασµό για τη µη συµµόρφωση τηςΤουρκίας µε το Πρόσθετο Πρωτόκολλο (σ.σ.την υποχρέωσή της να ανοίξει τα λιµάνια και τααεροδρόµιά της σε κυπριακά πλοία και αεροπλάνα), γεγονός που κράτησετην ευρωπαϊ κή πορεία της Τουρκίας ζωντανή», σηµειώνει, αναγνωρίζοντας πάντως ότι µε την εξέλιξη αυτή στενεύουν τα περιθώρια για πρόοδο στις συνοµιλίες για το Κυπριακό. Ο Φριντ επαναλαµβάνει την αµερικανική θέση υπέρ της υιοθέτησης του Κανονισµού για το Απευθείας Εµπόριο µε τους Τουρκοκύπριους, αν και εκφράζει αβεβαιότητα αν η γερµανική προεδρία «θα µπορέσει ή θα θελήσει να υπερισχύσει των Ελληνοκυπρίων».
Στο ίδιο τηλεγράφηµα ο Φριντ παραθέτει την ακριβή φρασεολογία µε την οποία πρέπει οι αµερικανοί διπλωµάτες να αναφέρονται στον Ρεν. «Κηρύττουµε στους µετανοούντες όταν µιλάµε σε εσάς για τη σηµασία οικοδόµησης του µεγαλύτερου επιτεύγµατος της Ε.Ε.: της επέκτασης µιας ζώνης ελευθερίας, ειρήνης και ευηµερίας στην ευρωπαϊκή ήπειρο»,«έχετε υπάρξει ένας καθαρός πρωταθλητής της ανάγκης για περαιτέρω διεύρυνση για το καλό των υπαρχόντων και των µελλοντικών µελών», «πώς µπορούν οι ΗΠΑ να ξεπεράσουν τη νευρικότητα ορισµένων χωρών της Ε.Ε. για τη διεύρυνση;» είναι µερικές χαρακτηριστικές φράσεις.
Ο Φριντ γράφει πως παρότι η Τουρκία επί της ουσίας δεν «τιµωρήθηκε» για την εφαρµογή του Πρόσθετου Πρωτοκόλλου, «η Ε.Ε. πρέπει σε αυτό το περιβάλλον να προσέξει να στέλνει θετικά σηµάδια στην Τουρκία γιατην ευρωπαϊκή προοπτική της» και επιµένει ότι η Ενωση πρέπει να κάνει άµεσα βήµατα για να εγκρίνει τον Κανονισµό για το Απευθείας Εµπόριο µε τους Τουρκοκύπριους, χωρίς όρους, όπως «η επιστροφή των Βαρωσίων, που προδικάζουν µια µόνιµη διευθέτηση του Κυπριακού!». «ΤΡΟΜΕΡΕΣ» θα ήταν οι συνέπειες του εκτροχιασµού της ευρωπαϊκής πορείας της Τουρκίας, σύµφωνα µε τον Ρεν.
«Οι (Τούρκοι) τεχνοκράτες που δουλεύουν έξω από τη λάµψη των µίντια είναι πλήρως αφοσιωµένοι στο να διασφαλίσουν ότι η διαδικασία θα παραµείνει ζωντανή. Υψηλοί αξιωµατούχοι όπως ο Ολι Ρεν συνεχίζουν να προειδοποιούν για τις τροµερές συνέπειες στις σχέσεις της ∆ύσης µε το Ισλάµ αν εξαφανιστούν οι ευρωπαϊκές φιλοδοξίες της Τουρκίας», γράφει ο αµερικανός πρεσβευτής στην Αγκυρα Ρος Ουίλσον σε εµπιστευτικό τηλεγράφηµα τον Ιούνιο του 2007, περιγράφοντας τη συνάντηση που έχει πραγµατοποιηθείστην Αγκυραµε την τρόικα της Ε.Ε., µε επικεφαλής τον Ολι Ρεν, τον ΥΠΕΞτης Γερµανίας Φρανκ Βάλτερ Στανµάγιερ και τον υπουργό Επικρατείας της Πορτογαλίας Ζοάο Κραβίνοας, και από την τουρκική πλευρά τον τότε ΥΠΕΞ Αµπντουλάχ Γκιουλ, τον υπουργό Επικρατείας και τότε επικεφαλής των διαπραγµατεύσεων µε την Ε.Ε. Αλί Μπαµπατζάν, τον σύµβουλο τουΕρντογάν Αχµέτ Νταβούτογλου και τον αναπληρωτή ΥΠΕΞ Ερτουγρούλ Απακάν.
Στη συνάντηση που έχει ο Ρεν µε την αµερικανίδα πρέσβειρα στο Ελσίνκι Μέριλιν Γουέρ τον Ιούλιοτου 2007, διαβεβαιώνει τη συνοµιλήτριά του ότι οι ευρωπαϊκές αποφάσεις για την πορεία της Τουρκίας δεν θα αλλάξουν, «παρότι τα µηνύµατα από τον Σαρκοζί υποδεικνύουν το αντίθετο». Οπως προκύπτει από το δηµοσιευµένο τηλεγράφηµα, ο φινλανδός επίτροπος προτείνει την εξής λύση στους Αµερικανούς: µπορεί η Ε.Ε.να συντάξει νέα συµπεράσµατα στο Ευρωπαϊκό Συµβούλιο, τα οποία «θα επιτρέπουν στον Σαρκοζίνα πει στη γαλλική κοινή γνώµηότι εισήγαγε την “προνοµιακή σχέση” µε την Τουρκία (σ.σ. αντί της πλήρους ένταξης)».
Και παράλληλα, συνεχίζει, «το φινίρισµα των συµπερασµάτων πρέπεινα περιλαµβάνει γλώσσαπου θα επιτρέπει στους Τούρκους ναπουν ότι αν µείνουν στην ευρωπαϊκή τροχιά, θα έχουν κάποιον έλεγχο επί της µακροπρόθεσµης ευρωπαϊκής προοπτικής τους». Μάλιστα, όπωςπεριγράφει το τηλεγράφηµα, οΡεν χαµογέλασε και είπε: «∆ενείναι πολύ κοµψό, αλλά έτσι λειτουργεί η Ευρωπαϊκή Ενωση». Υπενθυµίζεται ότι το 2007, λόγω των αργών µεταρρυθµίσεων στην Τουρκία σε συνδυασµό µε το Κυπριακό, ο Ρεν προειδοποίησε για επερχόµενο ναυάγιο των ενταξιακών διαπραγµατεύσεων της Τουρκίας.
Τον ∆εκέµβριο του 2006 η Ε.Ε. πάγωσε 8 από τα 35 διαπραγµατευτικά κεφάλαια της Τουρκίας, ενώεπί Ρεν ήτανη φινλανδική προεδρία της Ε.Ε. που προχώρησε αιφνιδιαστικά στην απόφαση να συζητηθούν 4 από τα 8 κεφάλαια. Σηµειώνεται ακόµηότι η φινλανδική προεδρία τηςΕ.Ε. το 2006, αφενός, προωθούσε τον Κανονισµό για το Απευθείας Εµπόριοµε τους Τουρκοκύπριους και,αφετέρου, µε τις προτάσεις της για το Κυπριακό απέκλειε την επιστροφή των Ελληνοκυπρίων στα Βαρώσια (Αµµόχωστος) και το άνοιγµα των αεροδροµίων στα Κατεχόµενα, χωρίς προηγούµενη συµφωνία του κατοχικού καθεστώτος.
ΓΙΑ ΤΟ ΣΧΕΔΙΟ ΑΝΑΝ.
Τον Μάρτιο του 2006, όπως προκύπτει από εµπιστευτικό τηλεγράφηµα από την Αθήνα, ο αµερικανός πρεσβευτής Τσαρλς Ρις συναντιέταιµε τον ΟλιΡεν και του λέει ότι η Κοµισιόν είχε αποφασίσει το 2004 πως το σχέδιο Ανάν δεν ήταν ανακόλουθο µε το κοινοτικό κεκτηµένο. «Πρόσφατα όµως η Λευκωσία επαναλαµβάνει ότι η ένταξή της στην Ε.Ε. έχει αλλάξει πλήρως τους όρους της επανένωσης (αµφισβητώντας τη συνέπεια του σχεδίου µετο κοινοτικό κεκτηµένο)», λέεικαι σηµειώνει ότι τίποτα δεν έχει αλλάξει.
Ο Ρεν, αναφέρει ο Ρις, «το σηµείωσε και είπε ότι και εκείνος θα αναζητούσε τρόπους για ναθυµίσει ότι στην τελική µορφή του το σχέδιο Ανάν δεν ήταν ανακόλουθο µε τους ευρωπαϊκούς κανόνες». Το ότι οι Αµερικανοί – και όχι µόνο – επιχειρούν βγάλουν από τη µέση το Κυπριακό για να µην εκτροχιαστεί η ευρωπαϊκή προοπτική της Τουρκίας δεν αποτελεί µυστικό.
Οπως προκύπτει από εµπιστευτικό τηλεγράφηµα της αµερικανικής πρεσβείας στις Βρυξέλλες, πουπεριγράφει τησυνάντηση του Μάθιου Μπράιζα (βοηθός αναπληρωτή ΥΠΕΞ των ΗΠΑ) µε αξιωµατούχους της Κοµισιόν και του Ευρωκοινοβουλίου τον Φεβρουάριο του 2006, ο σύµβουλος του Ρεν για τη ∆ιεύρυνση Ζαν Κριστόφ Φιλόρι λέει στον Μπράιζα ότι δεν πρέπει να περιµένει πως «οποιαδήποτε τουρκική κυβέρνηση θα ανοίξει τα λιµάνια της χωρίς κινήσεις άρσης της αποµόνωσης των Τουρκοκυπρίων» και ότι «το κλειδί είναι να δοθεί στην Αγκυρα η απαιτούµενη πολιτική κάλυψη για να εφαρµόσει το Πρόσθετο Πρωτόκολλο».
Στην ίδια συνάντηση, ο ολλανδός ευρωβουλευτής καιυπεύθυνος των εκθέσεων γιατην Τουρκία Καµιέλ Ερλινγκς σηµειώνει ότι «ακόµη και ο επίτροποςΟλι Ρεν – έναςσυνήθως ήρεµος Φινλανδός – έγινε πολύ ευαίσθητος ότανσυζητούσε την τουρκική “κωλυσιεργία” στα θέµατα θρησκευτικών ελευθεριών». Και αυτό επειδή ο Ρεν φοβόταν το επικείµενο ναυάγιο.
Δείτε το τηλεγράφημα παρακάτω.
id: 101238
date: 3/20/2007 21:00
refid: 07STATE35309
origin: Secretary of State
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07HELSINKI70
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TO RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 7805
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 9027
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 9620
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----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 035309
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ETRD, EUN
SUBJECT: ENGAGING EU COMMISSIONER FOR ENLARGEMENT OLLI
REHN IN HELSINKI
REF: HELSINKI 70
Classified By: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY DANIEL FRIED
FOR REASONS: 1.4 (b) AND (d).
1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 3.
2. (C) EUR/ERA appreciates Embassy Helsinki,s initiative in
reaching out to EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn as
reported in Helsinki 70, and encourages future meetings
whenever Rehn visits Helsinki. EU Commissioners can provide
valuable insights into issues of deep interest to the Bureau
and the Department. This cable provides guidance on key
issues in Rehn,s EU Enlargement portfolio.
3. (C) Action Request: The Department requests that Embassy
Helsinki schedule a meeting with Olli Rehn on his next visit
to Helsinki to discuss issues relating to EU enlargement.
Post may refer to the following guidance in engaging Rehn on
next possible occasion:
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
TURKEY/CYPRUS
4. (SBU) The Finnish EU Presidency brokered a compromise over
Turkey,s non-compliance with the Additional Protocol to the
Ankara Agreement that helped keep Turkey,s EU accession
process alive. But the affair has drastically narrowed the
scope for progress in the negotiations and soured an already
poisonous atmosphere surrounding those talks. Under the
pressure of national elections, nationalism is on the rise in
Turkey. Turkey insists that only when the EU lives up to
commitments made prior to Cyprus, accession to lift the
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots ) notably through
implementation of aid and trade regulations ) will it allow
Greek Cypriot vessels access to Turkish ports as it is
required to do for ships of all EU members.
5. (SBU) The EU approved ,259 million in aid to the Turkish
Cypriot community in fall 2006. Implementation of funded
projects has met with both practical and political obstacles;
it remains to be seen whether all available funds can be
contracted by the 2009 deadline. Although the January 22-23
EU Council called for work to resume on the Commission,s
direct trade regulation for the Turkish Cypriots, it is
unclear if the German EU Presidency will be able or willing
to outmaneuver the Greek Cypriots. Movement on trade and aid
could have beneficial spillover effects for a permanent
Cyprus settlement process under UN auspices, which will
almost certainly have to precede Turkey,s entry into the EU.
WESTERN BALKANS
6. (SBU) With the opportunity to resolve Kosovo,s status
this year, the international community is well positioned to
assist the Western Balkans move beyond the conflict of the
1990s and firmly on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration.
We need to focus on our objectives of regional stability and
economic prosperity for all the countries of southeast Europe
and of the region as a whole. At Thessaloniki in 2003, the EU
Council declared that the Balkans, future was within Europe,
but countries in the region have no clear sense of what that
means. 2006 was essentially a lost year for EU enlargement
in the Western Balkans; only Croatia got &closer to
Europe,8 by completing several chapters of the acquis
communautaire.
7. (C) Elsewhere in the Western Balkans, EU discussions on
integration have offered little reason for optimism. With
full membership seemingly a distant prospect, successive EU
presidencies have focused on a consolation prize ) travel
liberalization ) but that too has proven elusive. The
current modest objective of visa facilitation is largely
confined to containing planned increases in visa fees. Such
damage limitation does little to make travel easier; on the
contrary, the Western Balkans now face visa requirements for
travel to new EU members Bulgaria and Romania.
STATE 00035309 002 OF 004
8. (SBU) The last significant obstacle for Bosnia to conclude
a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU
stems from its failure to meet the EU criteria on police
reform. The U.S. supports EU pressure on Bosnia to create
more integrated, professional nationwide police structures.
However, the EU,s leverage on overall reforms will only
increase once Bosnia is in the Stabilization and Association
process. We will continue to support EU and Office of the
High Representative (OHR) efforts to forge a Bosnian
agreement that meets the EU,s police reform criteria, but
encourage the EU to demonstrate flexibility on what it deems
to meet these criteria.
9. (SBU) We support further EU-Serbian integration,
particularly in relation to a Kosovo decision. Constructive
integration entails engaging Serbia on war crimes issues.
SAA negotiations were suspended and membership in Partnership
for Peace (PfP) was denied due to Serbia,s non-cooperation
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), namely, the failure to arrest and transfer
to The Hague fugitive Ratko Mladic. In December, NATO
granted PfP membership to Serbia; the EU should consider the
impact that restarting SAA talks would have on a Kosovo
decision as well as ensuring that Serbia is mindful of its
obligation to cooperate with the ICTY.
10. (SBU) Stability in Balkan countries is highly dependent
on their prospects for integration with Europe. We are not
asking for shortcuts to integration ) only for clear
indications that the Western Balkan countries will enter the
EU eventually, and that the timing depends on the pace of
their reforms. The EU needs to move beyond the current
standstill: it should provide a starting date for accession
talks with Macedonia; issue clear and realizable goals for
Bosnian police reform; and find a way to overcome the impasse
over SAA negotiations with the new Serbian government.
-----------------------------
Policy Background Information
-----------------------------
11. (SBU) The U.S. supports the EU enlargement process as a
means to promote peace, stability and reform in aspirant
countries and the region as a whole. Key U.S. policy points
are as follows:
REHN,S LEADERSHIP
-- We are preaching to the converted when we talk to you
about the importance of building on the EU,s greatest
achievement: extending the zone of peace, liberty and welfare
across the European continent.
-- You have been an articulate champion of the need for
further enlargement, for the good of existing members as well
as future ones.
-- We welcomed your February 26 speech in Berlin and its
emphasis on the EU membership perspective as the greatest
transformative force in Europe.
-- As you indicated in the speech, the dynamic economic
growth resulting from enlargement is also the greatest
assurance that Europe will be a force to be reckoned with
throughout the 21st century.
-- How can the U.S. help overcome some EU countries,
nervousness about further enlargement?
TURKEY/CYPRUS
-- Although the Finnish Presidency-brokered compromise over
Turkey,s non-compliance with the Additional Protocol to the
Ankara Agreement helped keep Turkey,s EU accession process
on track, the EU should take special care in the current
political environment that it sends positive signals to
Turkey regarding its EU accession prospects.
-- It is important that EU live up to its obligations to lift
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. The October
agreement to disburse ,38.1 million of ,259 million in
aid was a good start, but the EU must now face down Greek
Cypriot opposition to implement the 24 projects that are
already funded, such as university scholarships, and
accelerate the disbursal process for the remainder to avoid
losing credibility and momentum.
STATE 00035309 003 OF 004
-- Most importantly, the EU should take rapid steps to
approve the Direct Trade Regulation for the Turkish Cypriot
community. This regulation must not contain conditions, such
as a return of Varosha, that pre-judge a permanent settlement
on Cyprus.
-- The United States, overarching objective in Cyprus is to
help foster a comprehensive settlement that reunifies the
island into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We actively
support the efforts of the United Nations to reconcile
differences and find common ground for a settlement. The EU
can play a positive role by making progress on aid and trade
to the Turkish Cypriot community; doing so will have positive
effects on a permanent settlement.
WESTERN BALKANS
Back to a Regional Focus on Integration
-- The EU integration process is the most important factor
for stabilizing the Balkans. Back-sliding, refugee flows,
emigration, and violence remain real possibilities if EU does
not decisively move toward integration. Security missions
are a band-aid, not a cure.
-- Technical debates about elements of a Kosovo status
settlement have overwhelmed planning for the prosperity and
stability of the region as a whole. We should get back to a
focus on regional stabilization, and Euro-Atlantic
integration as the prime catalyst.
-- The institutional changes encouraged by the integration
process can lay the foundation for increased investment and
job creation. They also provide structures for modern
administration and regional cooperation needed to combat
organized crime.
-- Nationalism and criminality disguised as nationalism have
been root causes of instability in the region. Through
integration, nationalism can be curtailed substantially by
improving economic conditions and, to a lesser extent by
rendering borders less important.
A Need for Clarity, and Momentum
-- 2006 was largely a lost year for bolstering EU enlargement
hopes in the Western Balkans, except in Croatia, which
successfully concluded some chapters in accession
negotiations.
-- EU policy on enlargement vis-~-vis the Balkans needs to be
made clear and made clear soon.
Serbia
-- EU talks with Serbia on a SAA have been suspended for a
year, making membership prospects more distant at a critical
time in the region.
-- NATO granted Serbia PfP membership. Similarly, the EU
should look for an opportunity to resume SAA negotiations
with Serbia, within a timeframe conducive to a Kosovo
settlement, while ensuring that Serbia cooperates with the
ICTY.
-- Your previous public statements on SAA for Serbia have
been particularly constructive. We support further
statements clarifying the EU,s engagement strategy with
Serbia, such as through the SAA process.
Bosnia
-- Achieving an SAA will be a landmark achievement for Bosnia
and should help drive additional reforms. We will continue
to support EU and OHR efforts to forge an agreement among
Bosnians that meets the EU criteria on police reform.
-- In light of the SAA,s importance as an engine for
achieving broader and more rapid economic and political
reform, we encourage the EU to demonstrate maximum
flexibility in determining whether Bosnia has met these
criteria.
Macedonia
STATE 00035309 004 OF 004
-- Macedonia was granted candidate status in December 2005,
but there is no starting date for accession talks and no
plans for setting one.
-- Macedonia has made impressive economic reforms and is
working to re-establish a productive government-opposition
dialogue. The EU can and should plan to start accession
talks.
Moving Forward
-- Without clarity that all of southeast Europe is moving
toward Euro-Atlantic structures, nationalism, demagoguery,
crime and their toxic progeny will continue to thrive in the
region.
-- The U.S. is not asking for a short-cut to EU membership.
But every country should have a sense that it is on track for
EU (and NATO) membership, and the timing depends on each
country's progress.
RICE
=======================CABLE ENDS==========================
id: 112053
date: 6/14/2007 13:27
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001515
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: PREL, EU, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU TROIKA MEETINGS: TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION
PROCESS SPUTTERS ONWARD
REF: ANKARA 1454
Classified By: Political Counselor Janice Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkey-EU Troika consultations held June 4 in
Ankara were constructive and served to underscore the
continued mutual commitment to pursuing eventual Turkish EU
membership, according to GOT and EU officials. Turkey's
membership aspirations continue, and the technical process,
though slowed by the EU's December freezing of negotiations
on eight chapters as a result of Turkey's refusal to open its
ports to Cypriot vessels, is moving ahead as well. The
question of how many additional chapters will be opened for
formal negotiation later this month remains. However, the
negotiation process continues, notwithstanding French
President Sarkozy's apparent determination to end it as well
as faltering public support in Turkey. END SUMMARY
CONSULTATIONS SHORT BUT SUBSTANTIVE
-----------------------------------
2. (C) Turkey-EU Troika consultations held June 4 in Ankara
were short but substantive, focusing not only on Turkey's
membership aspirations, but on broader international topics.
According to various EU member state embassy officials here,
the meetings lasted only three and a half hours due to German
FM Steinmeier's commitments later in the day in Berlin for
Germany-Canada consultations. In addition to Steinmeier, the
EU delegation was led by EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli
Rehn and Portuguese State Minister Joao Cravinhoas. Turkey's
key representatives included FM Abdullah Gul, State Minister
and Chief Negotiator on EU Accession Ali Babacan, Foreign
Policy Advisor to the PM and FM Ahmet Davutoglu, and MFA
Under Secretary Ertugrul Apakan, among others.
TURKEY'S EU ASPIRATIONS
-----------------------
3. (C) Ahmet Dogan of Turkey's Secretariat General for EU
Affairs said the EU delegation underscored the Union's
continued commitment to the negotiations and reiterated the
hope that formal talks on an additional three chapters could
be initiated before the end of June. Dogan said the three
chapters under consideration, on Economic and Monetary
Policy, Financial Controls, and Statistics, have no opening
benchmarks which Turkey needs to clear prior to the opening
of negotiations. Should the EU decide to move forward as
planned in these three areas, Turkey would be asked to submit
an opening position paper for each chapter; GOT bureaucrats
are busy preparing those.
4. (C) In contrast to Dogan's optimism about moving ahead
with all three chapters, German Embassy officials here said
that Steinmeier offered no such assurances. The German
presidency objective is to proceed if possible. They see the
process as open, and open-ended; whether or not member states
object to opening all three chapters at the moment, the
process itself will continue. Steinmeier noted that a large
majority of EU countries favor Turkey's candidacy, but it is
no secret that some - and at least two in particular (Cyprus,
France) - are critical. Steinmeier indicated to his Turkish
hosts that Turkey must help turn them around.
Sarkozy and Turkey's EU Accession
---------------------------------
5. (C) Reports of French President Sarkozy's determination to
offer Turkey status short of full membership, perhaps as
early as this December, have received considerable media
attention here and contributed to a backlash among the
Turkish public against EU membership talks. French embassy
officials confirmed press reports that Sarkozy's government
intends to try to block opening of negotiations on the
Economic and Monetary Policy (EMU) chapter. They pointed
out, however, that it may be too late. Dogan noted France
and Cyprus view opening negotiations on three new chapters as
rewarding continued Turkish intransigence on opening its
ports to Cypriot vessels; they are pressing to open just one
new chapter. He said the GOT will be disappointed, but not
surprised, if in the end the EU offers to open two new
chapters. Ironically, Turkey has a good story to tell on the
EMU, as it is already in compliance with two of the
Maastricht criteria only six years after its financial
crisis. Moreover, a Turkish EU Secretariat official pointed
out to us that opening the EMU chapter is purely symbolic in
any case, because nothing really happens on this chapter
until the Eurozone is ready to admit the accession country,
ANKARA 00001515 002 OF 003
after the country gains EU membership. The French officials
lamented that French efforts will only worsen soured
bilateral relations over the French parliament's passage of
an Armenian genocide resolution last Fall.
EU Keeping An Eye on Turkey
---------------------------
6. (C) Turning to domestic politics, FM Gul told the EU
delegation that Turkey-EU relations would play a role in the
July 22 general elections. Gul expressed hope that the
Turkish electorate would decide to re-elect a party committed
to continuing the EU negotiation process. Commissioner Rehn
underscored the EU's hope that Turkey's election would be in
accordance with democratic principles and Turkey's
constitution. Gul reiterated the Justice and Development
Party (AKP)-led government's commitment to pursuing the
reform agenda established earlier in the year in its EU
roadmap. He also indicated the next government, presuming
AKP is again in power, would take up the process of passing a
new Foundations Law and reform of penal code article 301,
both of which have been high priorities for the EU.
According to Dogan, the EU delegation emphasized the
importance the EU gives to Turkey's continued work in
enhancing freedom of expression and freedom of religion, as
well as trade union rights. The Troika also criticized the
military's role in Turkey, pointing to the April 27 "coup-by
memorandum" that many believe influenced the constitutional
court's decision to negate the presidential election process.
At the same time, Dogan said the EU delegation emphasized
its support for Turkey's secular democracy, which many Turks
would read to mean support for AKP's more secular opposition.
7. (C) Steinmeier pointed to the April 18 murders of three
Christians in Malatya as a big concern for the EU, which also
reflected very negatively for Turkey in the European press.
He stressed the need for a change in mentality among Turks
toward religious minorities and recommended that GOT
ministers meet with leaders of these communities. Steinmeier
expressed the EU's continued commitment to Turkey in its
fight against PKK terrorism but appealed for GOT restraint
and no precipitous action in connection with its struggle
against the PKK in northern Iraq. Gul responded that Turkey
has no hidden agenda regarding Iraq; it wants a unified Iraq
that is friendly, democratic, and stable. However, a lack of
sovereignty causes chaos, which breeds terrorism. Gul said
the PKK has gained access to weapons and explosives and the
ability to freely train its cadres in northern Iraq. Turkey
is expecting more urban bombings and the GOT is concerned
about how the Turkish public and media will react in the
current politically-charged environment.
Searching For a Way Forward on Cyprus
-------------------------------------
8. (C) On Cyprus, Steinmeier said the German presidency would
continue to put forth its best effort on a new trade
regulation for direct trade with northern Cyprus and opening
ports/airports. State Minister Cravinhoas pledged similar
effort on the part of the Portuguese. However, Steinmeier
said that even if no progress is made on direct trade, Turkey
remains obligated in the EU's eyes to open its ports and
airports to ROC trade. The Turks predictably countered with
the need to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriots and to find
a solution under UN aegis to the continued division of the
island. Gul blamed the Cypriot government for obstructionism.
Cooperation on Central Asia
---------------------------
9. (C) The Troika and Turkish delegations also discussed
Iran's nuclear ambitions, the Middle East Peace Process and
intra-Palestinian factional fighting, ongoing fighting in
Lebanon, prospects for Turkish-EU cooperation in Central
Asia, and efforts to improve ties between Turkey and Armenia.
On Central Asia, Steinmeier described a change in EU
strategy, now focused not only on energy but in helping push
for positive change in the entire region. The EU wants to
enhance EU-Central Asia cooperation on transport routes and
civil society dialogue, as well as energy projects like
Nabucco. The GOT delegation spoke of the great potential for
Turkish-EU cooperation in this region, especially in energy.
MFA Deputy U/S Cevikoz described the four "D's" of the
Turkish approach: democracy, dialogue, development, and
diversification. The Turks recognized that the Central Asian
states had for too long been under the thumb of big brother;
they were being careful not to appear to be a newer, more
modern version of the same. The Portuguese added that
ANKARA 00001515 003 OF 003
EU-Central Asia consultations would take place on the margins
of UNGA later this year. Cravinhoas also appealed for
Turkish pragmatism in its dealings with Armenia, viewing the
lack of bilateral ties as an obstacle to greater regional
cooperation.
10. (C) COMMENT: Despite political forces determined to drive
Turkey and the EU apart, the process continues to sputter
forward. With the AKP government having made EU accession a
centerpiece of its program, it is struggling to resist rising
anti-EU sentiment in Turkey and a more openly hostile
Euroscepticism from the military. Technocrats working
outside the glare of the media spotlight remain fully
committed to ensuring the process lives on. High profile
officials like Olli Rehn continue to warn of the dire
consequences for relations between the West and Islam should
Turkey's aspirations be extinguished. On the Turkish side,
Minister Babacan said the alternative to Turkey's EU
avocation is to be a third world country. The July 22
elections will help clarify whether the Turkish public - now
slightly favoring membership - sees the EU accession process
as an unacceptable national humiliation or a worthwhile
effort. In the meantime, planning for future Turkey-EU
cooperation will continue.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
id: 116071
date: 7/20/2007 10:37
refid: 07HELSINKI553
origin: Embassy Helsinki
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000553
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EUN, UN, TU, FI, YI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EU COMMISSIONER OLLI REHN
Classified By: POLITICAL CHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)
1. (C) Summary: EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn
told Ambassador Ware that French President Sarkozy's
opposition will complicate Turkey's EU accession bid, but
does not necessarily need to derail it if the EU manages
the process carefully. Rehn was pessimistic about
Kosovo, and very disappointed in the Serb leadership's
failure to realize that Russia's cynical handling of the
UNSCR process is directly contrary to Serbia's long term
interests. He predicted that the US and each EU member
state will ultimately be forced to make a decision about
unilaterally recognizing Kosovo's independence. EU
unanimity on recognition will not be possible, but
recognition "by the US and 15-20 member states" will be
necessary in order to demonstrate to Russia that it
cannot "dictate Europe's security policy." Rehn expressed
appreciation for US efforts to promote EU unity on Kosovo,
noting that our leverage with Romania could be useful.
End Summary.
2. (U) Ambassador Ware and PolChief met with EU
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn July 19 on the
margins of the "Finland Arena," a gathering of Finnish
political leaders that takes place annually on the
margins of the world famous Pori Jazz Festival.
MANAGING TURKEY. . .AND MANAGING SARKOZY
----------------------------------------
3. (C) Rehn suggested that Turkey's July 22 election
could have an "unpredictable" effect on Turkey's troubled
EU accession process. The AKP remains the best bet for
keeping reforms on track, and one-party governments -- as
opposed to coalitions -- tend to have the best record,
both on reform and in managing domestic expectations.
One troubling aspect, he added, is that the rapidly growing
youth vote in Turkey is divided, and there are no clear
leaders emerging.
4. (C) Turning to the EU's role, Rehn emphasized that the
Council-approved policies currently in place regarding
Turkey's accession process will not change -- despite
clear messages from President Sarkozy suggesting
otherwise. That said, Sarkozy promised the French
electorate he would seek to slow or even halt Turkey's
bid, and "one should not underestimate his determination"
to deliver on them. Rehn outlined one possible solution:
The EU may ultimately need to draft new conclusions that
allow Sarkozy to say to the French public, "I've
introduced 'privileged partnership' to the EU
discussion." At the same time, those conclusion's "fine
print" would have to include language that allows the
Turks to say that if they stay on track, they still have
some control over their long term EU prospects. "It's
not very elegant," Rehn smiled, "but that's how the EU
works."
KOSOVO: RUSSIA'S GAME IS SIMPLE
-------------------------------
5. (C) Turning to the Balkans, Rehn reluctantly predicted
that Moscow, will probably never allow a UNSCR mandating
Kosovo's independence to move forward. "Russia's UN
strategy is very simple," he explained. "If Kosovo is
resolved, Serbia is relieved of the burden of relying on
Russia and thus can immediately put itself on the faster
road to the EU." Russia is determined not to lose its
client relationship with Serbia, and will veto a Kosovo
UNSCR on that basis alone. Russia's stance on Kosovo has
everything to do with Russia's own interests, nothing
really to do with Kosovo, and -- perhaps worst of all --
runs directly counter to Serbia's long-term interests,
Rehn continued. Unfortunately, most of the Serb
leadership, including the Foreign and Prime ministers,
cannot or will not grasp this reality, and
President Tadic -- who does understand it -- "doesn't
have the guts or the tools" to move Serbia away from
Russia and toward the West.
6. (C) For now, EU unity behind Ahtisaari's proposals has
been shaken a bit, but remains intact. However, he
warned, if a UNSCR on Kosovo fails to emerge following a
brief period of additional negotiations, all bets on EU
unity are off. He singled out Romania as being
HELSINKI 00000553 002 OF 002
particularly susceptible to Russia's shop-worn arguments
about setting an international precedent on ethnic
minorities, and suggested that the US could play a helpful
role in convincing Bucharest otherwise. Rehn also suggested
that while Chancellor Merkel remained committed, the German
Parliament might move in a different direction absent a UNSCR.
UNILATERAL RECOGNITION
----------------------
7. (C) In the medium term, Rehn said that the US and the
EU still need to try to show the Serbs that Russia is not
acting in their country's best interests. However, in
the long term, the US and the 27 EU MS will need to face
the reality of unilaterally recognizing Kosovo's
independence. If, after four months, Moscow remains
obstructionist, "we have to be prepared to say to Russia
that it cannot dictate Europe's security policy."
Unanimity among the 27 will not be possible, Rehn added,
but we can still send a clear message to Russia if "the
US and 15 to 20 member states" unilaterally recognize
Kosovo. EU unanimity will, however, again be crucial on
the issue of a post-independence ESDP mission for Kosovo,
because "a coalition of the willing with no full EU
mandate would be a disaster," Rehn said.
WARE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 219899
date: 8/7/2009 11:28
refid: 09ANKARA1145
origin: Embassy Ankara
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09STATE77681
09STOCKHOLM467
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DE RUEHAK #1145/01 2191128
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001145
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, EUN, TU, SW
SUBJECT: TURKEY: SWEDES VIEW INCREASING AEGEAN TENSIONS AS
CONTRARY TO EU ASPIRATIONS
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 467
B. STATE 77681
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,c)
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador discussed reftels joint efforts
with Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp August 5 and noted, in
particular, that rising Turkish-Greek tensions over recent
Aegean events could inadvertently impact Turkey's EU
accession bid. Asp commented that Greece and Cyprus already
have attempted to raise the issue in the July GAERC meeting.
As EU President, Stockholm has pushed Ankara to take steps
that would ease stresses with Athens and Nicosia, namely
opening the Halki Seminary and backing down on objections to
Cypriot oil explorations. Despite a general feeling that
heavy lifting on Cyprus would have to wait until MFA U/S
Apakan (a hardliner on Cyprus/Greek issues) left for his new
assignment in September, Asp reported that he has already
seen signs of flexibility, including some from Apakan
himself. The most promising is a possible GOT declaration of
non-aggression and peaceful resolution regarding the
continental shelf. End Summary.
2. (C) In an August 5 meeting, the Ambassador reiterated to
Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp that the USG intentions to
work in tandem with Stockholm on issues related to Turkey's
EU accession bid as earlier discussed by EUR DAS Matt Bryza
and Swedish MFA Director Lars Wahlund in a July 19 DVC (ref
A). The Ambassador noted a disappointing turn from warming
Turkish-Greek relations punctuated by recent Turkish military
flights over the Greek-populated Agathonisi and Farmakonisi
islands. Such events could adversely impact the upcoming
Ankara Protocol review in November should Athens decided to
drag Brussels into a bilateral dispute over the Aegean.
3. (C) Asp commented that Brussels has traditionally chosen
to "stay out" of Turkish-Greek disputes. However, given the
importance of this year's Ankara Protocol review, he has
articulated similar concerns to the GOT. Both Greece and
Cyprus raised territorial complains against Turkey at the
July EU General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) meeting, reported Asp. As EU President, Sweden
managed to kill the discussion by convincing other members
not to intervene. Nevertheless, Cyprus will likely revive
the issue again before November. Asp agreed to echo the
Ambassadors concerns over Agathonisi and Farmakonisi with the
GOT.
4. (C) Under its EU Presidency, Stockholm has pushed Ankara
to open Halki Seminary as it would gain Turkey good will with
the Greek Orthodox community and benefit Istanbul as a 2010
European Capitol of Culture. Asp said that Swedish MFA U/S
Frank Belfrage pushed U/S Apakan hard on this issue during an
August 3 Brussels meeting. Asp had also encouraged lead GOT
EU negotiator Egemen Bagis to do the same and to show more
flexibility toward Cyprus. Bagis reportedly responded that
he was working on Halki, but that it would ultimately require
a reciprocal act in Northern Thrace. (NOTE: In contrast to a
month ago, we are hearing this linkage every time Halki comes
up. This is significant step backward. END NOTE) Cyprus,
however, would have to wait until September, when Apakan
assumes his new position as Turkish UN Permanent
Representative in New York.
5. (C) Asp reported, however, that Apakan has show signs of
softening his traditionally incalcitrant position on Cyprus.
During his meeting with Belfrage, Apakan reportedly said that
he would consider allowing Cypriots to attend one of the
three OECD education and cultural programs that Turkey had
previously blocked. Belfrage also encouraged Apakan to show
more flexibility on energy issues, namely Cypriot oil
exploration, as current Turkish objections will just prolong
Nicosia's efforts to block the opening of additional EU
chapters (namely energy) and to contemplate issuing a
declaration of non-aggression and peaceful resolution on the
matter. Asp reported he had been told since that the GOT was
working on such a resolution and would consult with the
Swedes regarding content and timing. (NOTE: Asp opined that
the EU has shot itself in the foot over the energy chapter by
allowing Nicosia to block its opening. Momentum is growing
amongst members to increase pressure on Cyprus to step down;
Nabucco has helped with this. END NOTE) Nevertheless, he
expressed concern to the Ambassador that the Turks may ask
the GOC for a guarantee of equal rights on the continental
ANKARA 00001145 002 OF 002
shelf in return. On the Ankara Protocol, Apakan reportedly
said that Turkey may consider a variation of the Finnish
Proposal of opening one airport and one port in exchange for
Famagusta.
6. (C) Comment: Asp is willing to give the Turks the benefit
of the doubt on issues such as the Aegean. As we have noted
previously, Athens' reluctance to explain why overflights of
Agathonisi and Farmakonisi are different (i.e. real
violations of sovereignty) has even the Swedes confused.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
JEFFREY
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 52231
date: 2/8/2006 14:52
refid: 06BRUSSELS429
origin: Embassy Brussels
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000429
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: PREL, EAID, CY, GR, TU, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU OFFICIALS AGREE ON NEED TO BUILD MOMENTUM ON
CYPRUS
Classified By: Political Officer Vincent Carver for reason 1.5 (b/d).
SUMMARY
- - - - -
1. (C) European Commission and Parliament officials agreed
with visiting DAS Bryza February 6-7 on the need to build on
the momentum created by Turkish FM Gul's recent proposal on
opening Turkish and Northern Cypriot ports. The EU officials
noted that Turkey could not open its ports to Cypriot vessels
without the political cover of movement toward ending
Northern Cypriot isolation. All agreed that a halt to
Turkey's EU accession negotiations could have serious
geostrategic consequences and negative effect on Turkey's
2007 national elections. END SUMMARY
2. (C) EUR DAS Matthew Bryza met with European Commission
Director General for Enlargement Michael Leigh, Commission
Unit Head for Turkey Christian Danielsson and advisor on
Turkey to Enlargement Commission Rehn, Jean-Christophe
Filori, February 6 and with Member of the European Parliament
(MEP) and EP Rapporteur on Turkey, Camiel Eurlings (Dutch,
Center-Right) February 7 to discuss Turkey and Cyprus.
Leigh, stressing that EU accession negotiations with Turkey
would proceed on their merits and not on political
considerations, emphasized the positive effects of the
negotiations. Once "taboo" subjects were now open for
discussion, with the EU and Turkey enjoying a more
sophisticated and higher level dialogue. Given pressure from
member states, the EU and Turkey are holding a series of
monthly seminars, including on issues such as human rights
and religious freedom. For their part, the Turks are taking
a practical approach. Leigh stressed that the process is
valuable and maintaining its momentum will be key to further
promoting reform in Turkey. In this light, the EU will
attempt to avoid the risk of Cyprus, possibly with other
member states, halting accession negotiations absent Turkish
implementation of the additional protocol.
3. (C) One way to avoid such blockage, Leigh explained, is
to convince Nicosia that direct trade with the north does not
imply recognition of the TRNC. Having the UN or another body
manage trade out of Famagusta is one option worth exploring
to allow a form of direct trade, while affording Greek
Cypriots a sense that they had not surrendered their claim of
sovereignty over the North. The Greek Cypriots, however,
continue to link Famagusta with their demand for a moratorium
on construction in the north and with a hand over of Varosha,
which the Turkish Cypriots reject. Still, by potentially
opening a debate on the Famagusta-Varosha issue, Ankara's
recent Cyprus proposal seems to reflect a new political
willingness by Ankara to fulfill its obligation to extend the
Additional Protocol (by opening Turkish ports to Greek
Cypriot ships). By so doing, Leigh continued, Turkey may
convey within the EU a sense of momentum on the difficult
port issue sufficient to allow the Commission to avoid
criticizing Ankara on this matter in its October progress
report.
4. (C) In any case, the EU recognizes the primacy of the
UN's role in forging an overall settlement. Commission Unit
Head for Turkey Danielsson emphasized the positive role
Athens has played on Cyprus, noting the U.S. might want to
continue to encourage Greece to play a helpful role in trying
to persuade Nicosia to be more reasonable. Danielsson
observed that there may be a window of opportunity for
progress after the Cypriot elections in May and before the
European Commission issues its annual monitoring report on
Turkey in October or early November. DAS Bryza agreed that
Greek FM Molyviatis has indeed been helpful, including with
the Greek aide memoire regarding the Gul initiative, which
points toward the Famagusta-Varosha proposal. DAS Bryza
added that the U.S. would continue to engage Athens on the
issue.
5. (C) Leigh noted that Turkish accession negotiations were
taking place within a wider context: public opinion in many
member states opposed Turkish accession, more parties are
calling for a closer examination of the EU's absorption
capacity (Leigh observed that this was generally perceived as
"code" for opposition to Turkish EU membership), and debate
was beginning over where Europe's borders are situated. The
Commission's tactic, Leigh added, is to try to keep
enlargement, particularly regarding Turkey, as part of a
larger debate on the future of Europe. Otherwise, many
people will focus on Turkey's differences with the EU rather
than on the EU's success in promoting reform and exporting
stability throughout southeastern Europe.
6. (C) Filori, in a separate meeting, acknowledged that no
Turkish government could be expected to open its ports absent
moves to diminish Northern Cypriot isolation. The key is to
avoid "the big clash that everyone foresees" by providing
Ankara the necessary political cover to implement the
Additional Protocol. According to Filori, the Commission
wants the Council to bless its financial aid package to the
north and provide additional tangible benefits to the Turkish
Cypriot population. Confidence-building measures could help
ease the sense of isolation as well, he added, stressing that
the EU recognizes the indispensable role of the UN in this
regard. That said, Filori added that Nicosia must acquiesce
to such measures and this "will be difficult, to say the
least."
7. (C) Filori reiterated Leigh's observations regarding
Greek Cypriot calls for the return of Varosha and a
moratorium on construction in the north. Bryza noted concern
over the possibility that Nicosia, sometime this year, would
send a ship as a provocation toward the Turkish coast with
Turkey preventing it from entering a Turkish port. Filori
predicted that, in this scenario, several member states would
support Nicosia and agree to suspend accession negotiations
with Turkey. Filori and Bryza agreed the U.S. and European
Commission should think through options for responding to
such a move by the Greek Cypriots.
8. (C) Dutch MEP and EP Rapporteur on Turkey Eurlings agreed
with DAS Bryza on the need to try to build on the momentum
created by the Gul proposal to avoid a possible stalemate on
accession negotiations. Eurlings also stressed that the U.S.
can continue to play a helpful role by quietly but firmly
persuading the Turkish leadership, "as a friend," to promote
further political and societal reforms. Erdogan and others,
Eurlings stressed, should drop their "fighting their way into
the EU" attitude and concentrate more on promoting reforms
such as opening the Halki Seminary and returning some
Christian churches to their religious communities. This, he
emphasized, would go a long way in helping shape a more
positive European public opinion about Turkey.
9. (C) Likewise, Eurlings underscored, Ankara must alter its
penal code, particularly articles 301 and 305, to allow fro
greater freedom of expression. Eurlings noted that even
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn (a usually calm Finn), became
very emotional when discussing Turkish "obstructionism" on
religious freedom and property rights with a Turkish
parliamentary delegation and GOT chief accession negotiator
Babacan in December. Eurlings cautioned that the end of 2006
could result in a crisis if Turkey does not implement the
Additional Protocol. He added that the end of 2007 could
bring an additional crisis if the EU determines that Turkey
has not demonstrated sufficient progress in meeting the
Copenhagen criteria on democracy and human rights under the
Association Framework Agreement.
10. (C) Focusing on religious tolerance, Eurlings stressed
the emerging consensus in the Netherlands on the need to
train imams in the Netherlands rather than allowing them
entry from abroad. He agreed with Bryza that a key challenge
would be to ensure that the trainers were themselves
moderate. Eurlings further agreed that Turkey's Directorate
of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) could be a helpful partner in
imam training, provided that the Diyanet agreed to reduce its
efforts to exert political control over Turkish emigre
communities in Europe.
COMMENT
- - - -
11. (C) DAS Bryza's EU interlocutors appeared genuinely to
want to avoid the "train wreck" predicted by some in Brussels
regarding Turkish accession negotiations by discussing ways
to help promote Ankara sufficient political cover to begin to
implement the Additional Protocol. They recognized that
Gul's proposal indicates an increased willingness by Ankara
to try to generate some more positive thinking on how to
proceed toward a compromise. They also agreed that one way
to help provide Turkey with some political cover was to ease
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, through EU aid for the
region and via confidence-building measures. While Eurlings
observed that Papadopolous "always says no" to any proposal
aimed at promoting a settlement, the EU officials agreed with
DAS Bryza on the need to continue talking on how best to
convince Nicosia to engage in a practical discussion aimed at
ending the deadlock. All also agreed on the need to engage
the UN and maintain it as the primary conduit for settlement
talks.
12. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. DAS Bryza's
energy-related meetings reported septel.
MCKINLEY
.
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 56108
date: 3/10/2006 15:48
refid: 06ATHENS681
origin: Embassy Athens
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000681
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PREL, CY, GR, CYPRUS
SUBJECT: CYPRIOT PRESIDENT GETS BOOST FROM PM ON HANDLING
OF CYPRUS ISSUE
Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In Athens March 7-9 on one of his frequent
working visits, Cypriot President Papadopoulos met top party
leaders and GoG officials, including PM Karamanlis, and got a
boost for his handling of the Cyprus issue. In a joint press
conference, PM Karamanlis praised the February 28 UNSYG
Annan-Papadopoulos meeting in Paris as a step toward eventual
resumption of negotiations and reiterated that Turkey must
meet its EU obligations. Press coverage was universally
positive with the theme that the ball was now in Turkey's
court. Papadopoulos was once more able to command Greek
support in his efforts to place the onus on Turkey and the
Turkish Cypriots. END SUMMARY.
Papadopoulos Gets Boost From PM
-------------------------------
2. (U) Cypriot President Papadopoulos, visiting Athens
March 7-9, met with the top Greek leadership, including PM
Karamanlis, President Papoulias and FM Bakoyannis, and got
strong statements of support for his handling of the Cyprus
issue and, implicitly, for his interpretation of his meeting
with the UNSYG. In a joint press conference after their
meeting, PM Karamanlis welcomed as an "extremely important
development" the February 28 meeting between UNSYG Annan and
Papadopoulos, a result of which was their proposal for
technical talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The PM
also stressed the need to create the proper conditions for a
resumption of talks "without constricting timelines" and
warned that "we do not have the luxury of another failure."
Karamanlis praised Cyprus for "once again" proving that it is
interested in a "just, lasting and viable" solution to the
problem.
3. (U) For his part, Papadopoulos, in answering a press
conference question, took a swipe at the U.S. interest in
direct trade with Cyprus. In so doing he rejected the
argument that such trade could help ease the isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots or equalize the economic imbalance between
the two sides.
4. (U) The visit attracted very positive and fairly
extensive press coverage, with reports emphasizing
Papadopoulos and Karamanlis agreeing that the ball is now in
Turkey's court and highlighting the need for Turkey to
implement the Ankara Protocol -- i.e., open its airports and
seaports to Greek Cypriot vessels.
Message to Papadopoulos
-----------------------
5. (C) In a March 8 meeting and in subsequent
conversations, MFA spokesman Koumoutsakos confirmed to poloff
that the private GoG message to President Papadopoulos was to
push to re-start negotiations. Asked if Greece worried that
Turkey's EU accession process might be in jeopardy if
negotiations do not resume, Koumoutsakos responded that it
was first and foremost Turkey's responsibility to honor its
EU obligations. However, he did admit that the GoG was
concerned that there was not a more positive environment
regarding a resumption of talks, even though publicly the GoG
was touting the February 28 Paris meeting as an important
step in this direction. Being able to indicate such
progress, he went on, would help the atmosphere within the EU
vis-a-vis Turkey when the Commission issues its avis in the
fall.
6. (C) Koumoutsakos rejected the notion that the GoG just
blindly supported whatever Papadopoulos proposed, saying that
former FM Molyviatis had been very active in moderating
Papadopoulos' behavior in the run-up to Turkey's October 3 EU
accession invitation. He added that this was in line with
the GoG's continued desire to keep its relations with Turkey
and the Cyprus issue on two different tracks.
7. (C) British Ambassador Gass told us that in his own
conversations, MFA Cyprus Director George Papadopoulos (no
relation) had told him that there was "understandable
euphoria" in Athens regarding the Annan-Papadopoulos meeting.
George Papadopoulos explained that President Papadopoulos'
idea for two parallel tracks -- one on
technical issues (health, the environment) and another more
substantial track that would deal with sensitive issues
(returns, for example) -- had essentially breathed new life
into efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem.
Annan Plan
----------
8. (C) Ambassador met briefly with EU Enlargement
Commissioner Ollie Rehn, on the margins of Rehn's March 9
speech sponsored by ELIAMEP, one of Greece's premier foreign
policy thinktanks. Ambassador recalled that the European
Commission had decided in 2004 that the Annan Plan was not
inconsistent with the EU acquis. Lately, Ambassador said,
Nicosia had been making repeated assertions that its
accession to the EU in 2004 totally changed the circumstances
for reunification (and thereby calling into question the
Annan Plan's conformity with the acquis.) Ambassador noted
that, in fact, nothing had changed, and he continued to make
this point from time to time. Rehn took the point and said
he would similarly look for ways to recall that in its final
form the Annan Plan had been found to be not inconsistent
with EU norms. (Comment: Recently, FM Bakoyannis declared
the Annan Plan "history," but in the context that it had been
rejected in its current form by a large majority of Greek
Cypriots, not because it might be inconsistent with the EU
acquis or unable to serve as a framework for a solution. End
Comment.)
9. (C) COMMENT: Papadopoulos used his February 28 meeting
with Annan to leverage endorsement from PM Karamanlis and
others here for his efforts to portray himself as truly
interested in resuming talks under UN auspices, as well as to
place the onus on Turkey/Turkish Cypriots to respond to the
technical talks offer.
Ries
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
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